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Abstract (145 Words) 
In this article, I examine the relationship between the speculative projects embarked 
upon by young entrepreneurs and bankers in Dhaka during 2013, and the attempts 
made by analysts and nation-branding experts to present Bangladesh as a worthy 
“frontier” for speculative foreign investment. In order to induce others to speculate on 
their visions for Bangladesh, they variously positioned the nation via reference to the 
ratings imposed on it by credit rating agencies, the emergence of regional hegemons 
including members of the BRICS, and the apparent decline of “formerly” developed 
European nations. As purchasing power comes to mark a nation’s position within a 
hierarchical global market, nationhood comes to be recast as consumer-citizenship. 
The speculative imaginaries projected by these entrepreneurs, bankers and nation-
branding experts have the capacity to both reinforce and rework the hierarchies into 
which “frontier” nations are routinely placed by analysts in global financial centres. 
For the definitive version see: https://brill.com/view/journals/puan/puan-overview.xml  




“Frontiers” and the Global Financial Hierarchy 
In mid-2013 Dhaka’s skyline, as viewed from the upper floor of the Bashundhara City 
mall, was marked by the thickets of reinforcing steel that protruded from dozens of 
speculative concrete structures. Noting the lack of construction work visible from our 
vantage point, my friend Fahmid1 attributed this to the forthcoming election: “They 
are waiting, to see who will win, which way the permits will go.” The election, 
scheduled for early 2014, did not materialize in the end. This of course did not 
prevent the scheduled election from acting in mid-2013 as a “present future,” or the 
possible horizon against which positions could be taken on the prospects for 
profitable property development under different configurations of Bangladesh’s 
duopolistic “partyarchy” politics.2 Fahmid then turned to talk of his uncle, recently 
returned from Greece. “It has been really tough there, he has had to close his 
restaurant – just for a while. It’s not like that here, I don’t think. Bangladesh is really 
coming up.” A few weeks later, while speaking to economists working in the 
Bangladesh Bank, the comparison between Greece and Bangladesh was made 
again: Bangladesh really was “coming up,” as evidenced in part by the recent receipt 
of its first sovereign debt rating by one of the Big Three credit rating agencies.3 And, 
as one economist put it, “the same could not be said for Europe – for Greece – right 
now, I don’t think.” 
                                                          
1 All names in this article have been changed to preserve anonymity 
2 Hassan, M., Islam, M.S., and Zakaria, S.M. (2014). “Partyarchy and Political Underdevelopment” In 
BRAC Institute of Governance and Development, ed., The State of Governance Bangladesh 2013. 
Dhaka: BRAC University, pp. 7-24. “Partyarchy” here refers to the tendency for business 
opportunities, as well as prospects in a number of professions and the civil service, to be shaped by 
allegiances to one of two major parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party. The 
fortunes of those allied with the incumbent party frequently tend to fare better than those allied to the 
opposition, making elections particularly charged moments. 
3 These being Fitch Group, Moody’s and Standard & Poor.  
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To view Greek austerity from Dhaka was to examine the “dynamics of reversal 
[whereby] societies or individuals that formerly enjoyed a higher standard of 
consumption must now make do with less”4 from a vantage point shot through with 
the dynamics of “emergence.” Perhaps Bangladesh could not lay claim to the scale 
of emergence expressed by India’s “arrival” as an investment destination of 
increasing geopolitical significance.5 Nonetheless, at least among Dhaka’s economic 
elite there was certainly a “shared perception of a relentless pursuit of the economic 
summit and a qualification earned by virtue of an unwavering focus on coaxing digits 
of growth out of the economy.”6 After all, in 2013 reclassification by UNCTAD from 
“Least-Developed” to “Developing” country seemed imminent to some 
commentators, and the Prime Minister had set a target of achieving “Middle-Income” 
status by 2021. Greece, however, was about to be reclassified from a “developed” 
economy to an “emerging” one by Morgan Stanley Capital International’s indexing 
service, whose roots lie in the International Finance Corporation’s attempts to 
rebrand the nations of the Third World or Global South as either attractive “emerging 
markets” or risky but profitable “frontiers.”  
During the 1980s, the formerly colonised countries of the South were re-branded 
“emerging markets” by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), as part of a 
deliberate effort to alter the perception that there were “no markets” in the Third 
World, and catalyse development led by the efficient allocation of overseas private 
                                                          
4 Knight, D. M. and Stewart, C. (2016). “Ethnographies of Austerity: Temporality, Crisis and Affect in 
Southern Europe” History and Anthropology, 27(1): 1-18, p. 2 
5 Kaur, R. and Hansen, T.B. (2016). “Aesthetics of Arrival: Spectacle, Capital, Novelty in Post-reform 
India” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 23(3): 265-275.  
6 Lakshminarayan, S. (2017). “Market Fundamentalism in the Age of ‘Haute Finance’: The Enclosing 
of Policy Space in Emerging’ India” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization, 17(4): 849-865, p. 
854. 
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capital.7  The term “frontier markets” was coined in 1992, and gained a life of its own 
when in 1997 the IFC started publishing data on 14 frontier markets (including 
Bangladesh), which were like emerging markets, but with smaller, less liquid, less 
transparent capital markets.8 This data came in the form of a stock index, a 
representation of average price movements through which financial markets might 
be known as independent entities governed by their own internal regularities.9 The 
IFC’s Frontier Market Index was soon purchased by Standard & Poor’s, and 
subsequently overtaken by Morgan Stanley Capital International’s (MSCI) frontier 
and emerging market indices.  
As Lisa Tilley observes, the MSCI indices allow a diverse array of postcolonial and 
post-Soviet countries to be grouped under the sign of “emerging” or “frontier” 
markets. These classifications (which may variously refer to entire countries, their 
sovereign debt, or equity markets) often have more to do with “a country’s position 
on a global hierarchy of market economies [since] in some cases these labels do not 
even correspond with the real positioning of a country’s economic performance and 
stability.”10 Indeed, the Financial Times’ Guide to Investing in Frontier Markets 
cautions against investing in individual frontier markets, recommending instead 
investments in funds that offer a “more diversified exposure to this group.”11  
                                                          
7 Tilley, L. (2018). “Recasting and Re-racialising the ‘Third World’ in ‘Emerging Market’ Terms: 
Understanding Market Emergence in Historical Colonial Perspective” Discover Society, 60. 
8 Today, the IFC defines frontier markets as the poorest 82 countries supported by the World Bank’s 
International Development Association, where “investment climate” reform is a key concern. Gilbert, 
P.R. (2018). “Class, Complicity and Capitalist Ambition in Dhaka’s Elite Enclaves” Focaal 81: 43-57.   
9 For an analysis of the history of stock indices, and particularly the role that the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average played in presenting “the stock market as a natural system and the price averages as the 
barometer of this system” see De Goede, M. (2005). Virtue, Fortune and Faith: A Genealogy of 
Finance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 104 
10 Tilley, L. (2018). “Recasting and Re-racialising the ‘Third World’”.  
11 Baxter, D. (2018). “How Can Investors Get Access to Frontier Markets?” FT Adviser, 
https://www.ftadviser.com/investments/2018/07/12/how-can-investors-get-access-to-frontier-markets/  
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The grouping of Bangladesh – along with 29 other countries including Argentina, 
Croatia, Kazakhstan and Senegal – as a frontier market is not without material 
consequences, reworking as it does the geographical imaginations of financial 
powerbrokers.12 Examining another grouping of nations within the global financial 
hierarchy, the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) that briefly featured 
in the financial press following the Eurozone crisis, Samuel Brazys and Niamh 
Hardiman identify an apparent solidity to this “heuristic,” with Irish bond yields being 
impacted by news coverage from non-Irish PIGS/PIIGS.13 Perhaps this should not be 
surprising. Imaginative capacities, narratives and processes of meaning-making are 
indispensable to the analysts, investors and executives who seek to predict, prepare 
for, and profit from, new financial frontiers.14 Discourses about the emergence, 
convergence and de-coupling of frontier or emerging markets with “developed” 
economies are essential if analysts wish to make sense of the numerical data they 
possess about stock market performance or trade activity.15 Try as market purists 
might to reduce financial flows, forecasts and transactions to the purely numerical, 
the need for a meaningful interpretive frame always re-asserts itself.16  
The interpretive frames and narratives that circulate around frontier and emerging 
markets frequently involve “strategic reformulations” of colonial discourse, 
emphasizing frontiers, pioneers, exploration and opportunities to profit from the world 
                                                          
12 Tett, G. (2010). “The Story of the BRICS” Financial Times, January 15. 
13 Brazys, S. and Hardiman, N. (2015). “From ‘Tiger’ to ‘PIIGS’: Ireland and the Use of Heuristics in 
Comparative Political Economy” European Journal of Political Research, 54: 23-42.  
14 Cameron, A. and Palan, R. (2004). The Imagined Economies of Globalization. London: Sage, p. 2. 
15 Heinemann, T. (2016). “Relational Geographies of Emerging Market Finance: The Rise of Turkey 
and the Global Financial Crisis 2007” European Urban and Regional Studies, 23(4): 645-661. 
16 Zaloom, C. (2003). “Ambiguous Numbers: Trading Technologies and Interpretation in Financial 
Markets” American Ethnologist, 30(2): 258-272, p. 262. 
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unseen since the days of Empire.17 The organisation of countries into a global 
hierarchy of market economies (from frontier, to emerging, to developed) operates at 
times to maintain a hierarchical distinction between “the ‘superior’ developed West 
and its ‘inferior’ Others,”18 replaying imperial geographical imaginaries which saw the 
ordering of racialized “differences on a hierarchical scale of decreasing worth.”19 
However, a focus on the imaginaries deployed by analysts and investors located in 
global financial centres like London, New York and Singapore, has led economic 
anthropologists, geographers and sociologists to overlook the perspectives of those 
who identify themselves with the future of “frontier” jurisdictions like Bangladesh, and 
attempt to align their own speculative prospects with those identified for the nation. 
Speculation as an Ordering Principle 
It is difficult to speak of “speculation” without encountering some kind of moralizing 
discourse, in which it is identified with outright gambling, or with the production of 
“fictitious” as opposed to “real” value.20 Anthropologists have used the term 
“speculation” to refer to economic action that is “unmoored from any legal or 
community constraints” 21 or “removed from human labour…and from real goods.”22 
                                                          
17 Sidaway, J. D. and Pryke, M. (2000). “The Strange Geographies of ‘Emerging Markets’” 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 25(2): 187-201, p. 195.  
18 Tilley, L. (2018). “Recasting and Re-racialising the ‘Third World’”. 
19 Braidotti, R. (2016). “The Contested Posthumanities” In: R. Braidotti and P. Gilroy, eds., Conflicting 
Humanities, London: Bloomsbury, p. 16. See for instance Koelble, T. and LiPuma, E. (2006). “The 
Effects of Circulatory Capitalism on Democratization: Observations from South Africa and Brazil” 
Democratization, 13(4): 605-631, p. 621. Koelble and LiPuma note that the racialized geographical 
imaginaries deployed by analysts concerned with post-apartheid South Africa led to a discounting of 
the country’s economic policy and a run on the Rand, which was not justified by any economic 
“fundamentals.”  
20 Hertz, E. (2000). “Stock Markets as Simulacra: Observation that Participates” Tsantsa, 5: 40–50. 
Hertz argues that hostility to speculation arises from a modernist discomfort with “virtual” signals that 
are neither entirely material (linked to production and economic needs) nor entirely social (since 
trading in signals on financial markets may in fact impact upon production processes).  
21 Graeber, D. (2011). Debt: The First 5000 Years. Brooklyn: Melville House.  
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For heterodox economists, speculation is often understood in related terms, as a 
form of economic action which generates “fictitious” or “fraudulent” capital, or the 
fictitious portion of a firm or entity’s market value, over and above its “real” value.23 
The counter to this position is that the value of financial assets is always a function of 
expected earning potential, and that as a result, “in the society of futurity, it is no 
longer possible to have a clear indication of the ‘real’ value of any assets.”24 
Recent work in anthropology, sociology and political economy has, however, 
engaged with speculation as a fundamental form of economic activity that is not 
amoral, nor unmoored from the “real” economy, nor confined to the activities of the 
speculators often imagined to populate securities and derivatives markets.25 Instead, 
speculation is seen as a fundamental form of action in a capitalist economy. It is a 
process of generating imaginaries that are capable of making meaning out of an 
uncertain world saturated with futurity; meaning that can guide economic action for 
yourself and for others.26 Anthropologists who have drawn analogies between 
speculation and divinatory logic likewise note that attempting to determine whether 
divinations were “true” is unhelpful; action provoked by divinatory diagnoses or 
predictions may alter the potential for any number of “present futures” to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
22 Gudeman, S. (2015). “Review Article: Piketty and Anthropology” Anthropological Forum, 25(1): 66-
83, p. 80.  
23 Henry, J. F. (2012). “The Veblenian Predator and Financial Crises: Money, Fraud, and a World of 
Illusion” Journal of Economic Issues, 46: 989-1006.  
24 Palan, R. (2013). “The Financial Crisis and Intangible Value” Capital and Class, 37(1): 65-77, p. 71. 
25 Miyazaki, H. (2007). “Between Arbitrage and Speculation: An Economy of Belief and Doubt” 
Economy and Society, 36(3): 396-415. Miyazaki describes how Japanese derivatives traders 
understand themselves in relation to the figures of the speculator, the hedger and the arbitrageur that 
populate modern financial textbooks: the speculator wishes to take a future market position; the 
hedger to eliminate exposure to an existing position; and the arbitrageur to make a profit by trading 
simultaneously in two markets.  
26 Bear, L. (2015). “Popularist Speculators and Technologies of Imagination on the Hooghly River” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 35(3): 408-423. 
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materialize.27 Likewise, speculative action ought not to be viewed as a process of 
guessing at the “real” economic value of an asset or opportunity, but as a process of 
positioning oneself in relation to others and their own speculative investments.28 With 
this in mind, I draw attention to the way that young entrepreneurs, bankers and 
nation-branding experts in Bangladesh sought to leverage the uncertainty faced by 
others who wished to profit from Bangladesh’s “frontier” market status in order to 
capitalize upon it, by inducing others to invest in the rival futures that they imagined 
for the nation.29 In the process, I highlight how these economic actors engage with 
the various metrics and measures that are used by analysts located in global 
financial centres, to position Bangladesh as a “frontier” within a global financial 
hierarchy of nations. 
“The Bangladesh Perception Deficit”: Branding Bangladesh as the Next 
Frontier 
“Bangladesh: ‘basket case’ no more.” So ran the headline of a 2010 feature for the 
Wall Street Journal/ Bangladesh, once dubbed a “basket case” by Henry Kissinger, 
now had much of which to be proud. With GDP growth of over 6 for three years (and 
a willingness to confront “radical” Islam), it was no longer Bangladesh that was called 
up when one thought of a “South Asian country ravaged by floods, governed by 
bumblers and apparently teetering on the brink of chaos, but Pakistan.”30 The 
                                                          
27 Zeitlyn, D. (2012). “Divinatory Logics: Diagnoses and Predictions Mediating Outcomes” Current 
Anthropology, 53(3): 525-546.  
28 Konings, M. (2018). “How Finance is Governed: Reconnecting Cultural and Political Economy” 
Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, 19(2): 135-151.  
29 Konings, M. (2018). Capital and Time. For a New Critique of Neoliberal Reason. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, pp. 16, 52.  
30 Dhume, S. (2010). Bangladesh, “Basket Case” No More. Wall Street Journal, 29 September. 
Although often attributed to Kissinger, the notion that aid dependence might render Bangladesh a 
“basket case” appears in fact to reflect the words of Ural Alexis Johnson, Kissinger’s under-secretary.  
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following year, Bloomberg ran with “Kissinger’s ‘basket case’ Bangladesh targets 
record growth.”31 For Bloomberg’s correspondent, if there was a more adequate 
power supply, the garment sector, the country’s growth engine, could boost GDP 
even more. Maybe 8% was possible. Bangladesh had, after all, been recently 
included among JP Morgan’s “Frontier Five” and Goldman Sachs “Next–11,” the 
frontier markets that seemed to be following in the footsteps of the emerging markets 
(including the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).  
Ijaz, one of the first fund managers I met in Dhaka, split his time between Dhaka and 
London for periods of three to four weeks at a time. He had set up a brokerage 
house and financial analysis firm in Dhaka, not far from the busy Bashundhara Mall, 
after spending 18 years working for global banks in the City of London, and his 
clients now included both financial houses in Bangladesh, and large “frontier market” 
focused funds based in London and New York, like BlackRock and Templeton (the 
“Frontier Five” and “Next-11” status of Bangladesh were displayed prominently on 
his firm’s promotional material). He was particularly concerned with what he termed 
the “Bangladesh perception deficit”: 
If you do a word association game what comes to mind, and mostly it tends 
to be negative. Natural disasters, poverty, corruption. And these stereotypes 
tend to be reinforced by the international media. The only positive brand 
association of Bangladesh is Professor Yunus32, he’s the brand icon, the 
brand rockstar…But look at our achievements. Bangladesh has the best 
sharp rate of growth, not the fastest but the most stable. And during the 
financial crisis Bangladesh only fell 1.2% of growth in that time. 
                                                          
31 Krishnan, U. (2011). “Kissinger’s ‘Basket Case’ Bangladesh Targets Record Growth” 
BloombergBusiness, 18 April.  
32 On Yunus as an aid celebrity, see Schwittay, A. (2015). “Muhammad Yunus: A Bangladeshi aid 
celebrity” In L. Richey, ed., Celebrity Humanitarianism and North-South Relations, London: 
Routledge. 
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There was the reality to Bangladesh, he noted, and then the perception. The 
difficulties foreign investors might face – in terms of legal structure and corporate 
governance – were the same issues you would face in any emerging or frontier 
market. The reality could change – and in the meantime, Bangladesh could compete 
with its “peers” as an investment destination. Changing the perception would be 
harder, and require a more concerted country branding exercise, which brought the 
Chambers of Commerce together with the Board of Investment, in order to emulate 
the success of India’s India, Inc. campaign. “On the other hand,” he continued: 
Bangladesh has the second best sovereign rating in South Asia. It’s behind 
India’s but it’s better than Pakistan, Sri Lanka. It’s the same as Vietnam, the 
Philippines – Moody’s and Standard & Poor don’t think Bangladesh is a 
risky place, and that’s their business, sovereign risk!  
Referring to Bangladesh’s recent acquisition of a sovereign rating, Ijaz extended a 
measure of the risk of a sovereign default (of the kind that has triggered austerity in 
Greece and beyond) to a diagnosis of Bangladesh’s fundamental condition. This was 
a condition that he felt was mis-represented, and he positioned himself and his firm 
to capitalize on foreign investors’ speculations about Bangladesh’s growth potential 
(thanks to the cheap cost of garment factory labour), and the possibility of a “real 
grab for value” in an economy de-coupled from Northern economies still lagging in 
the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis. As I left Ijaz after our first meeting, he 
explained that personal interest was “more compelling than the commercial logic,” in 
terms of his decision to move to Bangladesh and work on frontier market analysis 
and nation branding. “I could make a lot more money if I was still in the City even in 
these tough times.”  
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Ijaz attempts to leverage the uncertainty faced by others (about growth prospects in 
the post-financial crisis North in order to capitalize upon it, by inducing them to invest 
in the imagined futures that he helps to craft for a re-branded Bangladesh. There is 
no “real” economy to be sought beneath his speculative endeavours; instead, 
numerical representations of Bangladesh’s economic “fundamentals” are central to 
his efforts to re-brand Bangladesh and draw in speculative investment. This is not to 
say that his speculative endeavours do not rely on the continuation of necro-
capitalism in Bangladesh’s risky, low-wage garments sector: they precisely do.  
“Why Go Bangladesh When You Could Go Global?” The Automated Future 
Ijaz went on to introduce me to a number of brand consultants who were working, 
with the Board of Investment, to “re-brand” Bangladesh as an enticing investment 
destination, through campaigns which positioned the “Bengal Tiger” as a successor 
to the Asian Tiger economies, but equally relied on the promise of a cheap, young, 
disciplined workforce. Through these brand consultants, I was introduced to Dhaka’s 
nascent start-up scene, cultivated by American- and Canadian-born members of the 
Bangladeshi diaspora, who had worked for Silicon Valley tech giants before returning 
to Bangladesh. 
Newaz, a former Google intern involved in Dhaka’s start-up scene, described the 
“pure emotional outpouring” he felt at witness the “generational shift” that was due 
among Bangladesh’s political and economic elite now that “all their kids and have 
studied abroad.” The private sector would drive a new merit-based generation, he 
insisted, and there was plenty of incentive for younger members of the diaspora to 
return. Bangladesh is an “entrepreneur’s wet dream. There are problems left, right 
and centre everywhere you look and that is what an entrepreneur thrives on.” It was 
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a shame, Newaz suggested, that Bangladesh had put their “socially good 
institutions” into the NGO bucket, rather than having companies that are able to pay 
the best salaries “so you can have Silicon Valley people working on how to solve 
poverty rather than the next photo sharing app or whatever!” Indeed, a thriving tech 
scene in Dhaka was going to allow Bangladesh to become “really independent” and 
challenge an institutional reliance on donor support.33  
Automation, in particular, was key to Newaz’s speculative vision of Bangladesh’s 
future: 
Our parents’ generation were relationship and deal driven. Now we 
entrepreneur and product driven. Import-export is great, but tech is going to 
re-imagine and re-invent each of these industries. Everything from 
manufacturing to finance to politics. Software is eating the world. To me this 
is not even a choice. Because in ten years, all our factory workers will be 
replaced with autonomous robots. The only reason they’re not already is 
that the families that run these factories are technologically incompetent. 
Newaz had, he explained, been pitching the importance of automating factories to 
the international Chambers of Commerce and diplomatic missions dotted around 
Dhaka’s exclusive Gulshan district. The objections he heard, that people would lose 
jobs, were he said, simply part of the process of creative destruction. And the 
alternative is that “Burma will adopt robots and then we’ll be completely screwed!”  
Newaz’s project was unambiguously a speculative one that involved an attempt to 
insinuate himself into others’ strategies for dealing with the uncertainty that suffused 
                                                          
33 Bangladesh’s NGO sector is frequently positioned as the explanation for the “Bangladesh Paradox,” 
or Bangladesh experiencing development success as measured by human development indicators 
despite lower levels of income growth than its less successful neighbour India. See Chowdhury, 
A.M.R., Bhuiya, A., Chowdhury, M.E., Rasheed, S., Hussain, Z. and Chen, L.C. (2013). “The 
Bangladesh Paradox: Exceptional Health Achievement Despite Economic Poverty” The Lancet, 
382(9906): 1734–1745. 
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Bangladesh’s economy - and particularly the garment sector in the wake of the Rana 
Plaza disaster earlier in 2013. In this instance, his attempts to leverage the 
uncertainty faced by foreign investors in the garment sector, and their diplomatic 
representatives, were unsuccessful. A little later in the year, I watched Newaz 
present, along with other returnee members of the diaspora with a Silicon Valley 
background, at an investor forum in one of Dhaka’s expatriate clubs. With their roots 
in the culture of “clubbability”34 that insinuated itself into Dhaka during the period of 
British Imperial rule, Dhaka’s expatriate clubs now provide a space in which 
aidworkers, diplomats and foreign investors can mingle in a setting characterised by 
exaggerated nationalisms and images of a foreign “home.” Entry is frequently 
restricted to those who hold non-Bangladeshi passports.35  
In the audience at Newaz’s presentation, along with his fellow returnee 
entrepreneurs, were diplomats (representing the club’s home nation) and 
representatives of donor agencies and the World Bank Group. Like Ijaz, Newaz was 
primarily concerned with reworking “brand Bangladesh.” Unlike Ijaz, he did not see 
the promise of Bangladesh in an ability to attract investment based on cheap labour 
costs and a de-coupling from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Quite the opposite. With an 
image on-screen of a shirt made by one of the multinational clothing brands known 
to have a heavy presence in Dhaka’s garment factories, Newaz called attention to 
the “Made in Bangladesh” label. In 2013, it means cheap labour, he argued. But in 
2020, Made in Bangladesh will mean innovation. “We can’t be Silicon Valley, we 
                                                          
34 Sinha, M. (2001). “Britishness, Clubbability, and the Colonial Public Sphere: The Genealogy of an 
Imperial Institution in Colonial India” Journal of British Studies, 40(4): 489-521.  
35 On the role that expatriate clubs in cultivating post-imperial nostalgia in Bangladesh’s aidland, see 
Rajak, D. and Stirrat, J. (2011). “Parochial Cosmopolitanism and the Power of Nostalgia” In Mosse, 
D., ed., Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Expertise and Professionals in Development. 
Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
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don’t want to be a factory complex like Shenzen, and we definitely don’t want to be 
an outsourcing centre like Bangalore. But we can be a combination of the three.” If 
Bangladesh was going to “come up,” it was to be on these terms, and the attendees 
were by and large convinced. Another returnee entrepreneur who had been on stage 
earlier affirmed that they “would not invest in garments. A country really grows up 
when it switches from tertiary to secondary investment. There comes a time when 
you really have to make that choice.”  
Proffering themselves as the best placed to steer Bangladesh towards an 
automated, high-tech future, Newaz and his peers attempted to insinuate themselves 
into existing attempts to navigate economic uncertainty; to induce others to invest in 
the imagined futures that they had crafted for Bangladesh. The presentations they 
made at the expatriate club self-consciously reproduced the dramaturgy of the 
Silicon Valley start-up pitch, from the confident enthusiasm and “solutionism”36 of 
their content, to the relaxed-but-refined staging and seating. Referring to a parallel 
performative style, Kaushik Sunder Rajan has written of the “hype” that allows 
genomic medicine start-ups to function in the USA and India.37 The futures that start-
ups promise - and which must be realized if prospective investors are to receive their 
return - must be credible, if not necessarily true.38 But Sunder Rajan ultimately relies 
on a posited disjuncture between those forms of capital that are “directly dependent 
                                                          
36 A term popularised to Evgeny Morozov to reflect a Silicon Valley tech start-up orientation towards 
intractable social and developmental problems as mere matters of applying the appropriate 
technological solution.  
37 Sunder Rajan, K. (2005). “Subjects of Speculation: Emergent Life Sciences and Market Logics in 
the United States and India” American Anthropologist, 107(1): 19-30.  
38 There are clear parallels with the divination practices that anthropologists have studied, and which 
are concerned not with producing truth but guiding action in the face of multiple “present futures.” 
Zeitlyn, D. (2012). “Divinatory Logics.” 
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on the production of a commodity” and others which are generated through hype, 
and are therefore “speculative and only indirectly [dependent on production].”39  
In the approaches to re-branding Bangladesh, and attempting to either attract more 
investment into the garment sector or shift the nation’s trajectory toward a high-tech 
automated future, Ijaz and Newaz are not merely seeking to make the “right” 
predictions in order to realise “real” value. Rather, they are attempting to leverage 
others’ uncertainty about Bangladesh’s future and its place in the global financial 
hierarchy of nations, steering potential rivals and partners towards competing 
scenarios that they are each best placed to capitalize upon. In the process, they tap 
into images of Bangladesh that circulate among “frontier market” analysts (of a low-
waged, young, exciting but risky “Bengal Tiger”), as well as the representations of 
other territories (Shenzhen, Bangalore) that have come to act as a shorthand for 
certain forms of global economic future – and investability. 
At the expatriate club, after Newaz and his fellow returnee entrepreneurs had 
presented, a representative of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) took the 
stage to describe the “huge profit” that had been made from Bangladesh through 
firms like Bata Shoe, and Grameen Phone (which also happen to be some of the 
most-cited success stories for frontier market analysts). The future, he argued, was 
“not for Gulshan people,” but for the masses. He wanted to automate, to see 
rickshaws fitted with GPS systems and bKash mobile money systems: “My job is to 
make that future happen, faster. And that’s what I can do through building this 
community of tech entrepreneurs.” His excitement about the “conversion” of 
Bangladesh’s large, youthful population - especially those “beyond Gulshan” - into 
consumers was shared by another attendee, Tamim. Tamim was “looking for a 
                                                          
39 Sunder Rajan, K. (2005). “Subjects of Speculation.” 
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reason to come back,” and an automated future could be that reason. In the 
meantime, he ran a fund based in Singapore because “investors like Singapore, but 
not Bangladesh - it is hard to get foreign exchange out easily.” Tamim’s solution was 
to use “strategic transfer pricing” to repatriate profits derived from Bangladeshi 
investments back to Singapore.  
The enthusiasm that Newaz and his IFC backers had for Bangladesh’s post-garment 
factory, automated future seems both dreadfully naïve and painfully at odds with the 
reality of garment workers’ experiences in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse 
that had taken place earlier in 2013. As Rashedur Chowdhury describes, injured and 
traumatised workers, unable to work and abandoned by the spouses, often waited in 
vain for the bKash compensation that they had been promised by elite NGOs to 
whom garment buying multinationals had outsourced responsibility in the wake of the 
factory collapse.40 Nonetheless, Newaz and his colleagues had at least begun to 
enrol some fund managers and multilateral development agencies into their 
speculative project, placing themselves at the centre of one effort to craft a future for 
Bangladesh that is at least gaining partial ground in its dispute with Ijaz’s factory-
fuelled vision.  
“Bangladesh is not in the global market yet. It is second rate”: Singapore 
Calling 
Not everyone who worked in Dhaka’s financial sector was quite so well-placed to 
leverage others uncertainty and set in motion their own speculative projects. I met 
Jasim, a young banker, shortly after arriving in Bangladesh, at an iftar to break the 
fast during the month of Ramadan. Distracted by his new phone, Jasim apologised: 
                                                          
40 Chowdhury, R. (2017). “The Rana Plaza Disaster and the Complicit Behaviour of Elite NGOs” 
Organization, 24(6): 938-949. 
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“Sorry, I’m just really excited about the Bangladeshi brand.” His Walton phone was 
almost identical to the Samsung Galaxy S2, he told me, with parts made in the 
infamous Chinese Foxconn factories that produced the iPhone. It might be “SKD – 
slight knock down” because it was assembled in country, but it was “close to free” at 
only 18,000 taka (£150). And most importantly, it was Bangladeshi by brand. The 
affect generated by Jasim’s new Walton phone could perhaps be understood in 
terms of Robert Foster’s41 notion of consumer citizenship, whereby shared acts of 
consumption, rather than the circulation of media enabled by print capitalism help to 
generate new national identities. Except of course that a mobile phone costing 
18,000 taka in a country where the minimum wage for garment workers was 3000 
taka and – enthusiasm about “bottom of the pyramid” mobile money programmes 
like bKash notwithstanding – mobile phone “penetration” was only at 40%42 could 
hardly be viewed as a nationalizing consumer good. Nonetheless, it seemed to 
represent for Jasim the possibility that those with Bangladeshi citizenship and 
national identity might likewise scale themselves up and emulate more recognizably 
globalizing life projects.  
Jasim, like many of the guests at the iftar, was an employee of a large multinational 
bank in Dhaka that has begun to develop its own nationalizing networks, counting 
many Managing Directors of Bangladesh’s domestic banks as alumni. While wages 
were often higher in domestic banks, Jasim explained, “the reputation is bad. They’re 
basically run by politicians. They’re essentially a proprietary concern; you know you 
have only one man making all the decisions.” Discussions at the iftar party turned 
towards efforts that were being made by Gulf State and Singaporean banks to 
                                                          
41 Foster, R. (1999). “The Commercial Construction of ‘New nations’” Journal of Material Culture, 4(3): 
263–282. 
42 GSMA Intelligence. (2014). Country overview: Bangladesh. London: GSMA Intelligence 
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headhunt Bangladeshi managers from the multinational that most of the guests 
worked for, and the concomitant global prospects of those in attendance. “Indians,” 
began Mohammed, a mid-level manager at Jasim’s multinational bank, “will always 
take ten to twenty Indians with them when they are promoted overseas. Thais and 
Bangladeshis are smarter, but the Indian economy, it’s down to their sheer 
muscularity.” This was true, acknowledged Fahim, another colleague. “I’m sorry to 
say but it is true. If a Bangladeshi gets the job in Dubai, he’ll say ‘See you, I’m off!’” – 
in spite Fahim having earlier explained that one of his managers who had been 
headhunted by a Singaporean bank had not left, precisely because if he had taken 
the thirty people with him that he planned to, the staff left behind would be in trouble.  
Mohammed had met the headhunter in question, he said, at another iftar party, and 
when he discovered that Mohammed had an MBA from a British university, his 
attitude changed  
and he only talked to me for the rest of the night. Other people there didn’t 
like that. He said to me, “It’s a shame about your skin colour. If you changed 
that, we could get you a job in London!” 
Continuing a discussion of the material consequences of stereotyping practices, one 
of the guests’ cousins, “Australian born, with an Aussie passport” had been visiting 
Dhaka, “and so he went to the Aussie [expatriate] club. And he got kicked out of the 
pool.” Pointing to his own skin, Mohammed explained “It’s for white Australians only. 
And I wanted to say to [my cousin], ask them, are they Australian or are they 
English?” As they portrayed it, their globalizing ambitions seemed to be frustrated by 
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the stereotyping practices of Singaporean headhunters and the gatekeepers of 
Dhaka’s elite expatriate enclaves.43  
A few weeks after the iftar, I met with Jasim and his friend, Faisal, who worked for a 
transnational extractive industry corporation, in a pizza restaurant in Gulshan. This 
extractive corporation had a very good business model, Faisal explained, always 
making sure they left the country before the reserves were too low, so they could get 
a “thick price” for selling on their installations. The conversation rapidly turned to 
Faisal’s ongoing efforts to acquire a visa and get a job abroad. Just as there is a 
hierarchy of transnational connection for rural labour migrants in Bangladesh, 
beginning with the UK or USA, followed by Malaysia, and the Gulf States, there is a 
fairly clear destination hierarchy for young professionals in Dhaka’s banking sector.44 
This hierarchy is shaped by increasingly restrictive visa requirements and the 
permissions that are provided for residency (and the possibilities of acquiring 
citizenship) following postgraduate study. First on the list are Canada and Australia, 
and Faisal was planning to use the connections he acquired from working at a 
transnational corporation in Dhaka to get there. He would complete five years at the 
corporation and then go, “otherwise I have no chance of getting a handsome job, or 
a handsome life.”  
Jasim too planned to leave. When I asked why, he said: 
My parents have certainly spent a lot more on my education than your 
parents have on yours. I have worked in Europe before, and if I work here, 
doing credit checks, closing deals, maybe I will close a deal at one million 
                                                          
43 Country branding works on stereotypes, as country branding guru (and significant influence on 
Ijaz’s approach to Brand Bangladesh) Simon Anholt observes when he encourages his readers to ask 
themselves, “if you had two equally qualified candidates for a senior management role, would you be 
more likely to pick the Turk or the Swede?” Anholt, S. (2006). Competitive Identity: The New Brand 
Management for Nations, Cities and Regions. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 8 
44  
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dollars. It’s not the salary as such. For the same two hours’ work in 
Singapore, I could close 500 million dollars. Why wouldn’t I? 
Would you earn more, say on commission, I asked? “No, not necessarily. But 
Bangladesh is not in the global market yet. It is second rate.”  
The lack of correlation between Bangladesh and the global market was seen by Ijaz 
(above) as a component within Bangladesh’s competitive identity, insulating it from 
the global financial crisis, and enabling his own speculative “grab for value” as a 
frontier markets broker. In the context of a different life project, this lack of correlation 
with the global was putting a stay on Jasim’s ability to operate on a scale that was in 
line with his ambitions. This did not, however, mean that Jasim had no interest in the 
global future of the Bangladeshi nation-economy. He became visibly excited, rushing 
his speech as he explained that since his multinational bank was here, “they must be 
making profit.” The banking sector in particular was really strong, and “in a few 
years, Bangladesh is going to take off. I mean it’s really going to take off. It’s going to 
be flying. It really will take off. You can’t say that for Greece. Or even most of 
Europe.” 
Unlike Ijaz, it would not be Jasim who facilitated that “take off.” His fervent consumer 
citizenship, marked by his enthusiasm for the new Walton smartphone, would not 
keep him in Bangladesh, but it placed him within the unmistakably hierarchical nation 
that would soon be flying: 
The Board of Investment has piles and piles of applications from companies 
that want to come here. Even Indian companies. And why wouldn’t they? 
The buying power is incredible. Obviously not poorer people individually, but 
in total, the market is absolutely huge! 
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When the nation is imagined in terms of consumer citizenship, belonging becomes a 
matter of purchasing power. This is an unashamedly non-egalitarian form of 
citizenship that disguises its hierarchical constitution by treating purchasing power as 
a moral accomplishment. But anxiety is also generated for Jasim and his colleagues 
because they know that their globalizing ambitions will have to confront the 
stereotyping practices of members of a less-than-cosmopolitan transnational 
capitalist class. As such, there is always a risk that they fall victim to an overly 
successful nation branding strategy that does not allow them to differentiate 
themselves sufficiently from their less educated, less urbane compatriots.  
Like so many other middle-class residents of Dhaka during 2013, Jasim experienced 
Bangladesh’s economic dynamism and its attendant social re-organization in terms 
of “emergence,” a sense of imminent “arrival” that was only intensified by observing 
the apparent reversals which European nations like Greece appeared to be 
experiencing. But while Ijaz was well-positioned, as a former City of London banker 
and key knowledge broker for frontier market funds looking to invest in Bangladesh, 
to leverage his speculative position, and induce others to invest in the future he 
imagined for Bangladesh, Jasim saw his future lying elsewhere. His own fortunes 
could not be tied to a “second rate” economy, and it was not within his gift to 
accelerate - or profit from - the “take-off” that he felt was inevitable for Bangladesh. 
Like Tamim, Jasim sought to plot a future through engagement with Singapore’s 
financial sphere. But this was less about him inducing others to invest in his vision 
for the future, and more a product of the seductions of Singapore, whose 
government has been successful in promoting themselves as a “safe (tax) haven but 
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also rebranding it as Asia’s new exotic lifestyle destination and capital of fun and 
creativity.”45  
Re-imagining Global Financial Hierarchies 
The MSCI’s indices of frontier, emerging and developed markets may well re-
inscribe distinctions between the advanced “West” and the racialized, disorderly 
“Other,” even if nations come to be represented on this global financial hierarchy by 
the depth of their capital markets, the performance of major equities, and the rating 
of sovereign debt.46 There are certainly dimensions of frontier market discourse and 
analysis that would seem to lend support to Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s argument that that 
analysts, traders and the financial press together constitute a “geofinancial 
panopticon,” operating as “an ‘electronic jury’ voting its confidence or demonstrating 
its disapproval daily” with policies that do not meet the needs of frontier market 
investors.47 When “country risk” is elevated due to lower incomes (hence less 
purchasing power), indebtedness, or undesirable forms of political and civil 
mobilization, analysts may advise investors to keep their distance48 - although 
opportunities may be highlighted for those “with strong stomachs and an appetite for 
exotic countries.”49 
Yet analysts and powerbrokers in the world’s financial centres are not the only 
figures to be found conjuring futures for frontier markets, or attempting to enrol 
                                                          
45 Pow, C. (2011). “Super-rich Enclave and Transnational Elite Urbanism in Singapore” Geoforum, 
42(3): 382-393, p. 386. 
46 Tilley, L. (2018). “Recasting and Re-racialising the ‘Third World.’” 
47 Ó Tuathail, G. (1997). “Emerging Markets and Other Simulations: Mexico, the Chiapas Revolt, and 
the Geofinancial Panopticon” Ecumene, 4(3): 300-317. 
48 Kozhemiakin, A. (2015.) “Redefining EM: Asteriscs, New Acronym for Emerging Markets” Financial 
Times, 10 August. 
49 Sullivan, A. (2013). “Frontier Markets are Not for the Faint Hearted” Financial Times, 21 July. 
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others into their speculative endeavours and capitalize upon their geofinancial 
imaginations. As the ethnographic vignettes laid out above indicate, bankers, 
entrepreneurs and nation-branding experts involved in speculations about 
Bangladesh’s future draw upon the standard metrics utilised by frontier market 
analysts (such as sovereign credit ratings), as well as potted representations of key 
sites in the global economy (Shenzhen, Bangalore, Singapore) in order to breathe 
life into their speculative endeavours. What separates Ijaz and Newaz from Jasim 
and his friends is perhaps their ability to leverage others’ imaginations about 
Bangladesh’s future: Jasim’s ambitions are more closely tied to Singapore’s 
speculative promise, since he lacks the capacity to capitalize upon Bangladesh’s 
own trajectory of emergence.  
The notion that a panopticon-like geofinancial hierarchy simply reproduces colonial 
distinctions between the West and its Others is, however, troubled by the emergence 
of new geographical designations like that of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa). Jim O’Neill, the Goldman Sachs analyst responsible for promoting the 
BRICS heuristic, explicitly set out to break the distinction between developed and 
developing nations, based on the premise “the world economy was no longer gonna 
grow by just those so called advanced economies.”50 It would of course be 
misguided to embrace the emergence of the BRICS bloc and contemporary South-
South investments as a return to the Third World or Global South projects, whereby 
formerly colonised nations sought a new international financial order based on 
solidarity and opposition to an emerging neoliberal consensus on development.51 
                                                          
50 Wansleben, L. (2013). “’Dreaming with BRICs.’ Innovating the Classificatory Regimes of 
International Finance” Journal of Cultural Economy, 6(4): 453-471, p. 459. 
51 Prashad, V. 2007. The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. London: The New 
Press.  
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The neo-imperial or sub-imperial mantle taken on by BRICS nations and their 
corporations in other developing countries is increasingly well-documented.52 
Yet O’Neill’s attempt to break down the developed/developing divide, and the notion 
that the West is the engine of history, resonates with the demand made by 
anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff that “the West recognizes that it is playing 
catch up with the temporality of its others” and demands further reflection.53 How can 
the experience of economic emergence be narrated while still acknowledging the 
very real global financial hierarchies within which emerging and financial markets are 
placed? A recent controversy in the British media saw Radio presenter John 
Humphrys scoff at the head of the Rwanda Development Board’s “bizarre” notion 
that Rwanda was anything other than aid dependent and poverty stricken. In 
response, the Financial Times ran a rebuttal chiding Humphrys for his overt 
prejudices and lauding Rwanda – and other frontier markets – as the future of the 
global economy (and the smart choice for investors since they “care less when 
things change elsewhere”).54  
Incorporation within a geographical imaginary that places nations in a hierarchy from 
frontier, to emerging, to developed, certainly has consequences for Bangladesh (and 
Rwanda) in terms of capital flows, infrastructure investments and sovereign debt 
servicing. But their placement within a global financial hierarchy is not merely 
externally imposed; it is reinforced and reworked through the speculative projects 
embarked upon those like Ijaz, Newaz and Jasim. In order to induce others to 
                                                          
52 Bond, P. and Garcia, A. (2015). BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique. London: Pluto.  
53 Comaroff, J. and J. Comaroff. (2012). Theory From the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving 
Toward Africa” Anthropological Forum, 22(2): 113-131, p. 123. 
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speculate on their visions for Bangladesh, they positioned the nation via reference to 
the ratings imposed on it by credit rating agencies, the ‘emergence’ of regional 
hegemons including members of the BRICS, and the apparent decline of ‘formerly’ 
developed European nations. It is through the imaginaries projected by speculators 
such as these that the emergence of the West’s “Others” comes into contact with, 
and reshapes, the global financial hierarchies into which “frontier” nations are 
routinely placed.  
 
